Right View: That First Step Is A Doozey! (Part 9 of A 13-Part Series)
Returning again to Mr. MacPherson’s posts: in his “The Eightfold Path inside Christianity: Points 1 and 2” he states correctly that “Right understanding means knowing the Four Noble Truths.” (I might quibble with this by saying instead that it means directly seeing the four truths, but this is a small point.) He also correctly equates right view /understanding with seeing dependent origination, but then proceeds to misunderstand that term in a mystical sense.
As soon as one interprets Dependent Arising as asserting mystical “unity,” one can get away with just about anything. The Dhamma is reduced to a Mystical Blob, a black box where anything comes and anything goes, a wish fulfilling doctrine we can equate with everything and nothing. And so we are told that Dependent Arising “does not contradict essential Christianity” (which for Mr. MacPherson is contemplative Christianity), which equates a misconstrued Buddhist term with an idiosyncratically defined Christianity. I am sorry to be blunt, but this equation is a torturous case of factual distortion and wishful thinking and does nothing to shed light on the Buddha’s teaching or Christianity.
In the previous post I said a lot about right view (sammaditthi), but there are a few things I believe I can yet add. We have already discussed how right view equals seeing the four noble truths, and also how the four noble truths spring from the primordial insight of dependent arising; i.e. the two middle truths (arising and cessation) are directly built off it, the first truth describes the state of the putthujjana who has not seen it, and the fourth truth (that of the Path) describes how one obtains that insight. The point was also made that the difference between the mundane and supramundane, between not seeing and seeing (Dependent Arising), is absolute: the putthujjana sees avijja (“delusion”); the sekha sees nibbana.
Now the observant reader may have noticed something interesting: in enumerating the four noble truths, the Buddha goes on to define the fourth truth (the way to getting knowledge of the four truths) as headed by right view, and defines that as knowledge of the four noble truths. In other words, getting knowledge of the four noble truths requires knowledge of the four noble truths, which in turn requires knowledge of how to get to the four noble truths!
Remember my analogy of parallel lines?
Here we have a structure—embedded within the suttas themselves—that illustrates the recursive nature of avijja, and also indicates why the extinction of asmimana, of “I am-ness,” is so difficult. Seeing and non-seeing are absolutes—either you have insight or you don’t. And this is why avijja appears at the head of the list in dependent arising: it is the lock that seals the putthujjana within his cell of subjectivity, just as the arising of right view in the fruition moment is the key to getting out.
The first writer I encountered who pointed out this structure was Ñanavira Thera, and I cannot imagine anyone describing it better than he. I will therefore take the liberty to quote him at length:
The faculty of self-observation or reflexion is inherent in the structure of our experience. Some degree of reflexion is almost never entirely absent in our waking life, and in the practice of mindfulness it is deliberately cultivated. To describe it simply, we may say that one part of our experience is immediately concerned with the world as its object, while at the same time another part of our experience is concerned with the immediate experience as its object. This second part we may call reflexive experience. It will be clear that when there is avijja there is avijja in both parts of our experience, the immediate and the reflexive; for though, in reflexion, experience is divided within itself, it is still one single, even if complex, structure. The effect of this may be seen from the Sabbasava Sutta (M.2:8) wherein certain wrong views are spoken of. Three of them are: “With self I perceive self… With self I perceive not-self… With not-self I perceive self.” A man with avijja, practising reflexion, may identify “self” with both reflexive and immediate experience, or with reflexive experience alone, or with immediate experience alone. He does not conclude that neither is “self,” and the reason is clear: it is not possible to get outside avijja by means of reflexion alone; for however much a man may “step back” from himself to observe himself he cannot help taking avijja with him. There is just as much avijja in the self-observer as there is in the self-observed. And this is the very reason why avijja is so stable in spite of its being sankhata. Simply by reflexion the puthujjana can never observe avijja and at the same time recognize it as avijja; for in reflexion avijja is the Judge as well as the Accused, and the verdict is always “Not Guilty.” In order to put an end to avijja, which is a matter of recognizing avijja as avijja, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the puthujjana’s reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is patisotagami (M.26:19), or “going against the stream.” The Dhamma gives the puthujjana the outside view of avijja, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the ariyasavaka this view has, as it were, “taken” like a graft, and is perpetually available). Thus it will be seen that avijja in reflexive experience (actual or potential) is the condition for avijja in immediate experience. It is possible, also, to take a second step back and reflect upon reflexion; but there is still avijja in this self-observation of self-observation, and we have a third layer of avijja protecting the first two. And there is no reason in theory why we should stop here; but however far we go we shall not get beyond avijja. The hierarchy of avijja can also be seen from the Suttas in the following way:
But which, friends, is nescience?…
That which is non-knowledge of suffering,
non-knowledge of arising of suffering,
non-knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
non-knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, friends, is called nescience (M.9:66).
And which, monks, is the noble truth of suffering…
And which, monks, is the noble truth of arising of suffering…
And which, monks, is the noble truth of ceasing of suffering…
And which, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering?
Just this noble eight-factored path,
that is to say: right view…
And which, monks, is right view?…
That which is knowledge of suffering,
knowledge of arising of suffering,
knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, monks, is called right view (D.22:18ff).
Avijja is non-knowledge of the four noble truths. Sammaditthi is knowledge of the four noble truths. But sammaditthi is part of the four noble truths. Thus avijja is non-knowledge of sammaditthi; that is to say, non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. But since sammaditthi, which is knowledge of the four noble truths, is part of the four noble truths, so avijja is non-knowledge of knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. And so we can go on indefinitely. But the point to be noted is that each of these successive stages represents an additional layer of (potentially) reflexive avijja. Non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths is non-knowledge of vijja, and non-knowledge of vijja is failure to recognize avijja as avijja. Conversely, it is evident that when avijja is once recognized anywhere in this structure it must vanish everywhere; for knowledge of the four noble truths entails knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths, and vijja replaces avijja throughout (op. cit pp. 36ff).
There is one final point I wish to make in regards to right view. Mr. MacPherson was correct when he said “right understanding is cognitive”—meaning that for the one who obtains it a distinctly new understanding of the world arises. The passage from Ñanavira above clearly illustrates this, but we can go further as regards specific existential questions that plague human beings. In the following passage the Buddha contrasts the (right) understanding of the sekha against the (wrong) understanding of the putthujjana:
When, monks, a noble disciple [sekha] has clearly seen with correct wisdom as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen phenomena, it is impossible that he will run back into the past, thinking: “Did I exist in the past? Did I not exist in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what did I become in the past?” Or that he will run forward into the future, thinking: “Will I exist in the future? Will I not exist in the future? What will I be in the future? How will I be in the future? Having been what, what will I become in the future?” Or that he will now be inwardly confused about the present thus: “Do I exist? Do I not exist? What am I? How am? This being—where has it come from, and where will it go?”
For what reason? Because the noble disciple has clearly seen with correct wisdom as it really is this dependent origination and these dependently arisen phenomena (S.12:20).
In other words, the sekha sees the lie in viewing the world with the sense of “I” or “me” or “mine.” Though he still experiences subjectivity (asmimana), the self is known for the illusion it is, like a man in the desert who sees a cool garden and pools of water but comprehends it all as a mirage. He is not fooled, unlike the commoner who naively chases after the illusion. The arhant, of course, will not even see the illusion, much less be entrapped by it.
But this is not the case for the men and women of the Bible, even with its most august figures: Yahweh and Jesus. Consider the following, one of the most famous passages in the Bible:
Then Moses said to God, “If I come to the people of Israel and say to them, ‘The God of your fathers has sent me to you,’ and they ask me, ‘What is his name?’ what shall I say to them?” God said to Moses, “I AM WHO I AM.” And he said, “Say this to the people of Israel, ‘I AM has sent me to you’” (Exodus 3:13-14).
Yahweh’s choice of names is unfortunate, for at S.35:248 the Buddha has something very specific to say about the notion behind it:
In conceiving, one is bound by Mara; by not conceiving, one is freed from the Evil One.
Bhikkhus, “I am” is a conceiving… Conceiving is a disease… a tumor… a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: “We will dwell with a mind devoid of conceiving”…
Bhikkhus, “I am” is an involvement with conceit… Involvement with conceit is a disease… a tumor… a dart. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: “We will dwell with a mind in which conceit has been struck down.” Thus should you train yourselves.
The Biblical god plainly never heard the Buddha’s advice or, if he did, he chose not to follow it:
I am the LORD your God… (Exodus 20:2)
You shall have no other gods before Me (Exodus 20:3).
You shall not worship them or serve them; for I, the LORD your God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers on the children, on the third and the fourth generations of those who hate Me, but showing loving kindness to thousands, to those who love Me and keep My commandments (Exodus 20:5).
You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain, for the LORD will not leave him unpunished who takes His name in vain (Exodus 20:7).
The God of Abraham, whatever else he may be, is clearly a victim of attavada (“self view”) and suffers from a terminal case of asmimana (subjectivity, the “conceit” I am).
And what conceit! In addition to lording it over the hapless Israelites, he is the self-proclaimed creator of the world: “Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?” he asks Job (in Job 38:4). The rest of his speech (chapters 38 and 39) consists of a catalogue of boasts about his power and supremacy. As a religion professor of mine once put it, God’s “answer” to Job is, “I’m bigger than you are!”
Now compare this to the wonderful story in the Kevaddha Sutta (D.11) where a monk asks the Great Brahma the following question: “Where do the four great elements—earth, water, fire, air—cease without remainder?” and Brahma replies: “I am Brahma, the Great Brahma, the Conqueror, the Unconquered, the All-Seeing, All-Powerful, the Lord, the Maker and Creator, the Ruler, Appointer and Orderer, Father of All That Have Been and Shall Be…” Needless to say, he didn’t know the answer to the monk’s question—but the Buddha did. (Wanna-be creator gods are the Rodney Dangerfields of the suttas: they get no respect. See also my post on “The Morals of God and the Buddha” for a further examination of the [lack of] character of the Biblical deity.)
Now consider Jesus, often counted by well-intentioned Buddhists as an “enlightened man.” Yet he, too, like the God he claimed to be, was afflicted by sakkayaditthi (“identity view”) and thought and made pronouncements about his self in the past, the present and the future. Whether he claimed to have been divine or not is irrelevant—he was still very much a self, a someone—and suffered as such.
Now Jesus had not yet come into the village, but was still in the place where Martha met Him. Then the Jews who were with her in the house, and consoling her, when they saw that Mary got up quickly and went out, they followed her, supposing that she was going to the tomb to weep there. Therefore, when Mary came where Jesus was, she saw Him, and fell at His feet, saying to Him, “Lord, if You had been here, my brother would not have died.” When Jesus therefore saw her weeping, and the Jews who came with her also weeping, He was deeply moved in spirit and was troubled, and said, “Where have you laid him?” They said to Him, “Lord, come and see.” Jesus wept. So the Jews were saying, “See how He loved him!” But some of them said, “Could not this man, who opened the eyes of the blind man, have kept this man also from dying?” (John 11:35-37).
And He withdrew from them about a stone’s throw, and He knelt down and began to pray, saying, “Father, if You are willing, remove this cup from Me; yet not My will, but Yours be done.” Now an angel from heaven appeared to Him, strengthening Him. And being in agony He was praying very fervently; and His sweat became like drops of blood, falling down upon the ground (Luke 22:41 ff).
Compare these famous Biblical passages to what the Buddha says in the Sabbasava Sutta (M.2:7ff):
This is how he attends unwisely: “…Shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I become in the future?”…
When he attends unwisely in this way, one of six views arises in him. The view…”It is this self of mine that speaks and feels and experiences here and there the result of good and bad actions; but this self of mine is permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and it will endure as long as eternity.” This speculative view, bhikkhus, is called the thicket of views, the wilderness of views, the contortion of views, the vacillation of views, the fetter of views. Fettered by the fetter of views, the untaught ordinary person [assutava putthujjana] is not freed from birth, ageing, and death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair; he is not freed from suffering, I say.
Plainly, Jesus, whether man or god (or perhaps, rather, because he was a man or a god), did not possess right view; he had neither put an end to suffering nor seen a way to its end. And so Ven. Ñanavira, in his commonplace book, could pen these lines:
Q: Why the Buddha rather than Jesus?
A: Jesus wept.
Finally, compare the above to what transpired after the Buddha’s passing (mahaparinibbana):
And at the Blessed Lord’s final passing there was a great earthquake, terrible and hair-raising, accompanied by thunder…
And those monks who had not yet overcome their passions wept and tore their hair, raising their arms, throwing themselves down and twisting and turning, crying… But those monks who were free from craving endured mindfully and clearly aware, saying: “All compounded things are impermanent—what is the use of this?” (D.16:6.10).